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Abstract 
This paper investigates how integration policies and welfare state regimes have 
affected the socio-economic integration of immigrants, focusing on eight 
European countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Belgium. It presents comparative data on 
integration policies and welfare states regimes. The expectations derived from 
this comparative policy analysis are tested with cross-national data on integration 
outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial segregation, and in-
carceration. The results suggest that multicultural policies, which grant im-
migrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for 
host country language acquisition and interethnic contacts, when combined with 
a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market partici-
pation, high levels of segregation, and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants 
among those convicted for criminal behaviour. Sweden, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, which have combined multicultural policies with a strong welfare state, 
display relatively poor integration outcomes. Countries that either had more 
restrictive or assimilationist integration policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
France) or a relatively lean welfare state (the United Kingdom) have achieved 
better integration results. These differences are highly consistent across the 
three domains of integration that are examined, with the exception of segregation 
rates in the United Kingdom.     
 
 Zusammenfassung 
Das vorliegende Papier untersucht, wie sich integrationspolitische Ansätze und 
wohlfahrtsstaatliche Regime auf die Integration von Migranten auswirken. Es 
werden vergleichende Daten zu den Integrationspolitiken und wohlfahrts-
staatlichen Regimen in acht europäischen Ländern vorgestellt: Deutschland, 
Frankreich, Großbritannien, Niederlande, Schweiz, Schweden, Österreich und 
Belgien. Die daraus abgeleiteten Hypothesen werden mit ländervergleichenden 
Daten zu den Integrationsergebnissen in den Bereichen Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung, 
Segregation der Wohnbevölkerung und Inhaftierung überprüft. Die Ergebnisse 
deuten darauf hin, dass multikulturelle Politikansätze, die Migranten einen leich-
ten Zugang zu gleichen Rechten gewähren und keine starken Anreize setzen, die 
Sprache des Aufnahmelandes zu erlernen und interethnische Kontakte zu 
pflegen, in der Kombination mit großzügigen wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Leistungen zu 
einer geringen Erwerbsbeteiligung, starker Segregation und einer deutlichen 
Überrepräsentation von Immigranten unter Strafgefangenen führen. Schweden, 
Belgien und die Niederlande, die multikulturelle Politik mit einem starken Wohl-
fahrtsstaat verbunden haben, verzeichnen relativ schwache Integrationserfolge. 
Länder mit entweder restriktiverer bzw. stärker auf Assimilation ausgerichteter 
Integrationspolitik (Deutschland, Österreich, die Schweiz, Frankreich) oder einem 
eher schlanken Wohlfahrtsstaat (Großbritannien) haben bessere Integrationser-
gebnisse erreicht. Die Unterschiede sind über die drei untersuchten Integra-
tionsbereiche hinweg sehr konsistent, mit Ausnahme des Segregationsniveaus in 
Großbritannien. 
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 Introduction 
Immigration has become a highly controversial topic since the beginning of the 
21st century, and ‘multicultural’ policy approaches to immigrant integration have 
lost much of their former popularity. The case of the Netherlands plays a crucial 
role in these debates as the country was long regarded as an exemplary case of 
successful multiculturalism, but has now come to be regarded as a prime 
example of the failure of such policies. As I will show below, the Netherlands had, 
compared to other European countries, granted immigrants a wide range of rights 
and a high degree of formal equality. The Netherlands also stood out in granting 
immigrants differential multicultural citizenship rights, for instance special 
provisions and institutions for religious, linguistic, and ethnic minorities in 
education and in the media, and affirmative action policies of a wider scope than 
in other European countries. 
Ethnic relations had long remained peaceful in the Netherlands, but after 9/11 
this changed. In the days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, a series of attacks on Islamic objects such as mosques occurred that 
was unrivalled in Europe (Allen and Nielsen 2002). On a smaller scale, there 
were also acts of property damage and arson against Christian churches. Half a 
year later, the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn challenged the broad elite 
consensus on immigration and integration, and criticized fundamentalist 
tendencies in Dutch Islam. He was murdered by a left-wing activist a few days 
before the election but his new party gained fifteen per cent of the vote 
nonetheless.  
Another dramatic development was the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh by 
an Islamic fundamentalist of Moroccan descent in November 2004, followed by 
the arrests of several other Islamist radicals who had conspired to murder a 
range of public figures, including parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali. As after 9/11, 
the murder of van Gogh was followed by a wave of violence. In November 2004 
alone, a total of 174 violent incidents related to the van Gogh murder occurred, 
including 47 attacks against mosques, and 13 against churches (Van Stokkum et 
al. 2006: 141). The Dutch multicultural dream had become a nightmare. 
What went wrong with Dutch multiculturalism and what does it teach us about 
immigrant integration policies more generally? I will address these questions by 
comparing the Dutch case to seven other European immigration countries. I will 
argue that easy access to equal rights, including unrestricted access to welfare 
state arrangements, in combination with a large degree of facilitation of cultural 
differences have had unintended negative effects on the socio-economic 
integration of immigrants, which have contributed to the increased interethnic and 
inter-religious tensions of the last years, not just in the Netherlands, but in several 
other European countries.  
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I will challenge a central assumption in the literature on multicultural rights. In this 
view, recognition of cultural differences, the granting of special cultural rights, and 
protection against cultural discrimination are effective counterweights against 
cultural bias and exclusion in immigration societies, which prevent immigrants 
from developing their full potential as citizens and keep them in a socio-
economically marginalized position (e.g., among many others, Kymlicka 1995; 
Young 1990). This assumption is challenged by the evidence that I present 
below, which shows that far from being a country that has successfully reduced 
socio-economic inequalities between immigrants and natives, the Netherlands is 
among the European immigration countries in which immigrants are socio-
economically worst-off, in spite of the relatively far-reaching recognition and 
rights that they enjoyed. Moreover, those other European immigration countries 
that most resemble the Dutch combination of multicultural integration policies and 
a generous welfare state – Sweden and Belgium – display similarly unfavourable 
integration outcomes, when compared to countries that have either had less 
inclusive integration policies – e.g., Austria or Germany – or a relatively lean 
welfare state – the United Kingdom.      
The analysis supports the idea that there is a ‘progressive dilemma’ (Goodhart 
2004) between sustaining an inclusive welfare state with a high provision level, 
on the one hand, and policies of multiculturalism that facilitate immigrants` 
access to welfare state arrangements, on the other. My argument is not the more 
common one that immigration and ethnic diversity undermine support for the 
welfare state (although that may be so, e.g., Phillips 1999; Barry 2001, but see 
counterarguments in Banting and Kymlicka 2006). This version of the progressive 
dilemma thesis argues that multiculturalism is in principle good for immigrants, 
but that it undercuts support among the majority population for the welfare state. 
My argument is that in a welfare state context multiculturalism may not be 
beneficial for immigrants at all, because it risks leading to dependence on welfare 
state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalization.   
I emphasize right at the outset that my analysis is not meant to draw conclusions 
about the normative justifiability of multicultural policies per se. The issue I 
address is whether such policies have been effective instruments for promoting 
the socio-economic participation and equality of immigrants. Regardless of the 
answer to that question, one may see certain policies to recognize and sustain 
cultural differences as valuable for their own sake. It is equally important to stress 
that when I speak of multiculturalism in this paper, I mean a particular type of 
policy approach to the management of immigration-induced cultural hetero-
geneity, not that heterogeneity itself. As Banting and Kymlicka (2006: 9) have 
argued, the term multiculturalism is often used to describe both the policy 
approach and the factual increase in heterogeneity as a consequence of 
immigration, but it is important to keep the two distinguished, lest deficiencies of 
particular policies are mistaken for defects of immigration and diversity as such.  
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I will compare the Netherlands to the set of West European countries that have 
been the most important destinations of immigration since the 1950s, namely 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and 
Belgium. I do not consider the very different contexts of European countries such 
as Spain, Italy, and Ireland that have only recently become important destination 
countries. Neither does the analysis extend to the classical immigration countries 
outside Europe such as Canada or the USA because these countries have a 
much longer and very different history of immigration and have more selective 
immigration regimes that would bias the comparison with European countries. 
Issues of comparability across the countries considered in this paper related to 
different statistical definitions of the immigrant population and to the composition 
of the immigrant population will be discussed later in the paper. 
In what follows, I first show how integration policy approaches vary across the 
major European immigration countries. I then discuss cross-national variation 
regarding the inclusiveness and provision levels of the welfare state, and argue 
how welfare state regimes and integration policies interact. The expectations 
derived from this comparative policy analysis are then tested with cross-national 
data on integration outcomes regarding labour market participation, spatial 
segregation, and incarceration rates.1 The results suggest that multicultural 
policies, which do not provide strong incentives for host country language 
acquisition and for interethnic contacts, when combined with an inclusive and 
comparatively generous welfare state, produce low levels of labour market 
participation, high levels of spatial segregation, and a relatively strong 
overrepresentation of immigrants among those involved in criminal behaviour. 
                                                     
 1 Another domain of socio-economic integration that merits comparative investigation is 
education. However, the available data here seem to be too unreliable. The main 
source are the PISA studies that were conducted in 2000, 2003, and 2006 under the 
auspices of the OECD, which measure the knowledge levels of fifteen-year old 
schoolchildren in reading, mathematics, and science. At least for the Netherlands, the 
PISA surveys suffer from serious underrepresentation of immigrant children. 
According to De Knecht-van Eekelen et al. (2006), 11.1% of the children included in 
the Dutch 2006 PISA study were born abroad, or had at least one parent born 
abroad. However, according to population data of the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(calculated from CBS 2004: 78, 80), 20.7% of the 10-19 year olds have such an 
immigration background. There is thus a strong selection bias in the Dutch PISA data 
regarding immigrant children, and those who did not participate will tend to be lower 
performers and children who skip classes. Given this selection bias, it is anyone's 
guess how valid comparisons of the average scores of immigrant and non-immigrant 
children in the Netherlands are. Crul and Vermeulen (2004) also conclude that the 
available evidence for comparison of educational outcomes of immigrants is very 
limited. They consider dropout rates to be (relatively speaking) ‘the most comparable 
across countries’ (2004: 8). Comparing dropout rates (i.e. leaving school without a 
diploma) for children of Turkish descent in the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Austria, and Belgium, they find that these are below 10 per cent in the last three 
countries, but over 30 per cent in France and the Netherlands (Crul and Vermeulen 
2004: 24-25). 
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Integration policies in comparative perspective 
Many comparative studies of citizenship and integration policies have focused on 
the rules for nationality acquisition (e.g., Brubaker 1992; Cinar 1994; Kleger and 
D’Amato 1995; Safran 1997). Nationality acquisition is a crucial determinant of 
migrants' access to citizenship rights, since it entails that they become formally 
equal before the law. Together with Sweden and Belgium, the Netherlands 
belong to the European countries with the highest naturalization rates, whereas 
Germany, Switzerland, and Austria have traditionally had low naturalization 
rates.2  
Access to citizenship rights neither starts nor ends with the acquisition of 
nationality. If we consider T.H. Marshall's (1950) three categories of rights – civic-
legal, political, and social – Western countries have extended most civil rights to 
all residents. An exception concerns conviction for serious crimes, which may 
lead to an alien’s loss of residence permit and deportation. Some countries, such 
as Germany and Switzerland have relatively strict rules in this regard, whereas in 
France and the Netherlands the possibilities to expel foreigners are more limited 
(Koopmans et al. 2005: 42-43).  
Many social rights are also available to citizens and residents alike, but long-term 
dependence on social welfare may block access to a secure residence status or 
to naturalization in some countries, including Germany and Switzerland (see, 
e.g., Bauböck 1995; Guiraudon 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). The political rights 
to vote and to stand for election have, by contrast, generally not been granted to 
non-nationals (Layton-Henry 1990), but in some countries, including the 
Netherlands and Sweden, foreign residents can vote and be elected in local 
elections.  
Racism and discrimination can be important barriers toward the realization of 
equal rights. Dutch anti-discrimination legislation, together with the United 
Kingdom’s, compares favourably to most other European immigration countries 
(Niessen and Chopin 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005: 45-49). The Dutch situation 
differs from the British in that discrimination on the grounds of religion is fully 
covered by the legal framework and jurisprudence, whereas in the United 
Kingdom it is a long-standing complaint, particularly of Muslim organizations, that 
                                                     
 2 Naturalizations in the Netherlands peaked in 1996, when no less than 11 per cent of 
the stock of foreign residents was naturalized over the course of one year. The 
naturalization rate has since decreased due to several legislative changes, but also 
because of a reduction in the pool of potential candidates who are willing to naturalize 
and fulfil the minimum residence criterion of five years. Among the eight countries 
compared here, the Netherlands (6.9 per cent) had in 2002 the second-highest 
naturalization rate after Sweden (7.9 per cent). Belgium (6.7 per cent) followed 
closely behind the Netherlands (calculated on the basis of 2002 naturalization figures 
and the 2001 stock of foreign residents from Migration Information Source: 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/). 
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anti-discrimination provisions under the Race Relations Act are badly suited to 
combat discrimination related to religious difference (Modood 1988).  
An example of the Dutch approach is a 2007 court case, which overturned a 
decision by local authorities to deny social welfare benefits to a woman wearing 
full facial covering on the grounds that the impossibility for colleagues or 
customers to see her face and eyes made her de facto unemployable.3 Although 
an extreme (though not a singular) case, this woman’s situation illustrates one 
way how multiculturalism combined with a relatively generous welfare state can 
lead to socio-economic marginalization. Letting the woman’s interpretation of her 
religious duties prevail over the local government’s concern with employability, 
has the likely consequence that she will remain life-long dependent on social 
welfare benefits. That this is a choice she is willing to make is in turn related to 
the level of benefits in the Netherlands, which does not (in combination with other 
forms of aid for low incomes such as rent subsidies) condemn one to abject 
poverty. 
The Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by the British 
Council and the Migration Policy Group allows a comparative assessment of the 
degree of legal equality of immigrants across 25 EU member states, as well as 
Norway, Switzerland, and Canada.4 Countries score high on the index when 
immigrants can easily and with minimal preconditions obtain equal rights. The 
index covers 140 indicators in six areas: access to nationality, long-term 
residence, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access, and political 
participation.  
Table 1 presents the overall Index scores for the eight countries of the present 
study. Sweden turns out to offer the greatest degree of legal equality to 
immigrants, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries not only 
form the top three in Table 1, but also in the larger MIPEX comparison of 28 
countries. The three German-speaking countries, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Austria, are characterized by a relatively high degree of inequality between 
immigrants and non-immigrants. Austria occupies a particularly low position in the 
ranking of what the authors call “best integration practices.” Among the 28 
countries, it occupies the 26th place. As we will see further on, what counts as a 
“best practice” depends a lot on what we focus on, formal equality of rights, or 
practical equality of outcomes. 
                                                     
 3 See http://www.elsevier.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/asp/artnr/156391/rss/true/index. 
html, accessed 20 September 2007. 
 4 See www.integrationindex.eu, accessed 17 October 2007. 
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Table 1:  Degree of legal equality and cultural rights for immigrants 
 MIPEX Index 
2007 (high score 
= high equality)
LOI Index 1995 
(low score 
= high equality)
Cultural rights index 2002 
(-1 to +1; 
high score = 
many cultural rights)
Austria 39 3.47 - 
Switzerland 50 3.33 -0.85 
Germany 53 2.48 -0.20 
France 55 1.83 -0.52 
United Kingdom 63 2.68 0.31 
Netherlands 68 1.57 0.76 
Belgium 69 1.73 - 
Sweden 88 1.25 - 
The third column of the table gives an impression of the stability of cross-national 
differences over time, by comparing the 2007 MIPEX scores to the Legal 
Obstacles to Integration Index (LOI) compiled by Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) 
for the year 1995. Despite the turbulences and controversies around immigration 
and integration in recent years, the cross-national differences have been 
remarkably stable over the period 1995-2007. Sweden, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands formed the top-three in both years, although in 1995 the Netherlands 
still came in second place, before Belgium. Austria and Switzerland were 
classified as the countries offering the least equality to immigrants in both years, 
and France remained situated in the middle of the spectrum. The only major 
difference between the two distributions concerns the United Kingdom, which 
scored worse than France and Germany in the 1995 LOI index. Waldrauch and 
Hofinger themselves however expressed doubts about the validity of this result, 
which is mainly due to the fact that in the British common law tradition many 
immigrant rights are not formally laid down in legislation, but determined by 
jurisprudence. ‘Therefore’, the authors conclude, ‘the UK, being the methodologi-
cal “problem child” in the sample, might be judged by the LOI-index as being 
more rigid than it really is’ (Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997: 279). An additional 
reason why the United Kingdom emerges as offering more equality in the 2007 
index is that the LOI index did not include anti-discrimination policies, an area 
where the United Kingdom compares favourably to many other countries. 
Next to this individual equality dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguish a 
second dimension of immigrant rights, referring to cultural rights that are 
attributed to them as a group, as well as to cultural obligations that the state 
expects them to meet in order to obtain full citizenship rights. Whereas the 
individual equality dimension of citizenship measured by the MIPEX and LOI 
indices refers to the equal treatment of residents regardless of their race, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, or cultural background, the cultural dimension of 
citizenship, refers to differential rights and institutions based on racial, cultural, or 
religious group membership. This second dimension of citizenship has been at 
the centre of philosophical discussions and political controversies on multi-
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culturalism and assimilation (e.g., Kymlicka 1995; Bauböck 1996; Joppke and 
Lukes 1999; Parekh 2002). In their study, Koopmans et al. (2005) considered the 
following areas for the cultural rights dimension of citizenship: 
1 Cultural conditions for naturalization; 
2 Allowances for Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions (call 
to prayer, slaughtering of animals, burial) 
3 Cultural rights and provisions in public institutions (Islamic schools and 
religious classes, toleration of the headscarf, special programming in 
public broadcasting); 
4 Political representation rights (special consultative bodies);  
5 Affirmative action in the labour market. 
The final column of Table 1 shows the overall score (on a scale from -1 to + 1) of 
the five countries included in the Koopmans et al. study. The Netherlands turn 
out to be the country that has granted immigrants the broadest range of cultural 
rights and special institutions. The United Kingdom comes in second place and 
Germany occupies an intermediary position. France and Switzerland are the two 
countries that tend most clearly towards an assimilationist position, granting 
relatively few cultural rights to immigrants and demanding a relatively high 
degree of cultural conformity in public institutions. France is the only country 
where there is a clear contrast between the two dimensions of citizenship as it is 
relatively inclusive on the individual equality dimension but reluctant to grant 
cultural rights. 
The lack of other systematic studies of the cultural dimension of citizenship 
makes it difficult to indicate precisely where countries outside this set of five are 
situated. Sweden emerges from the literature as the European country that most 
closely approximates the kind of multicultural policies found in the Netherlands 
(see Alund and Schierup 1991; Runblom 1994; Soininen 1999). Belgium shares 
with the Netherlands a history of social and religious pillarization, which has also 
led to a segmented incorporation approach with regard to immigrants.5 However, 
                                                     
 5 Pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) was a model of socio-political organization, in which 
social and religious groups were largely institutionally separated, each with their own 
schools, media, labour unions, political parties, housing corporations, sports clubs, 
and a wide range of other associations. Contact existed mainly among the elites of 
the pillars, who operated according to a ‘live and let live’ principle, in which each 
group retained a great deal of autonomy in areas relevant to cultural and religious 
identity, for instance in education. Because of the greater degree of religious diversity 
(Catholics and various Protestant denominations, whereas Belgium was in large 
majority Catholic) Dutch pillarization was more encompassing and wider in scope 
than its Belgian counterpart (see Lijphart 1968 for the Netherlands; Huyse 1987 for 
Belgium). Since the secularization of the 1960s and 1970s, pillarization has ceased to 
be a lived reality for most citizens. However, many of the institutional structures 
remained, as was the tradition of solving conflicts by granting cultural and religious 
autonomy to groups, facilitated by state subsidies and consultation rights. In that 
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there are important differences in Belgium between the two language regions, 
with the Walloon region following a more French-style approach, and Flanders 
more strongly influenced by the Dutch multicultural approach (e.g., Bousetta et 
al. 1999; Gsir et al. 2005). Where possible I will therefore present data on the two 
parts of Belgium separately. 
Some examples from various spheres of society may illustrate Dutch policies 
regarding cultural rights for immigrants. In the realm of education (see Koopmans 
et al. 2005: 57-61) the Netherlands were until 2004, when the programme was 
discontinued, one of the few European countries that offered full state funding for 
education in ‘own language and culture.’ Classes in minority religions are still 
offered in public schools, and the Dutch educational system has allowed Muslims 
and Hindus to establish dozens of fully state-funded denominational schools, 
which are more widespread in the Netherlands than in any other European 
country (although even in the Netherlands they only cover a modest percentage 
of all Muslim and Hindu children). 
Dutch public radio and television are legally obliged to reserve twenty per cent of 
their broadcasting time for programmes catering to ethnic minorities, some of 
them in immigrants’ own languages.6 As recent as 2002, national public 
television aired a toddler’s programme parallel in four languages: Dutch, Turkish, 
Arabic, and Berber.7 In addition, there are subsidized Muslim and Hindu 
broadcasting organizations, which produce a few weekly hours of religious 
programmes on public radio and television, as well as dozens of local public 
television programmes catering to a variety of ethnic groups produced by the 
state-subsidized broadcasting organization Multicultural Television Netherlands 
(MTNL).8 
The Netherlands have since the 1980s had a series of affirmative action 
programmes for the public sector, some general (such as the Etnische 
Minderheden bij de Overheid programme), some for specific professions such as 
the police or the military.9 The Dutch state even assists dual Turkish nationals 
who are employed in the Dutch police or military to meet their obligations to the 
country of origin by offering (since 2002) an interest-free loan of €6.000 as well 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense, pillarization was a kind of multiculturalism avant-la-lettre, and predestined 
these countries, and especially the Netherlands, to embrace a multicultural policy 
approach to immigrant integration (Koopmans 2002). 
 6 See the yearly reports ‘Multiculturele programmemering’ of the public broadcasting 
organizations, e.g. http://pics.portal.omroep.nl/upnos/ZakoiolHC_RAP_MC2004_ 
21.pdf, accessed 22 September 2007 
 7 See www.omroep.nl/nps/circuskiekeboe/, accessed 22 September 2007. 
 8 See the website of MTNL (www.mtnl.nl), accessed 22 September 2007. 
 9 For the EMO programme, see Smeets (1993). For positive action in the military, see 
http://archief.trouw.nl/artikel?REC=9e55716d9701ec471c5b8a7b9a345d71, accessed 
9 October 2007. 
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as twenty days of paid leave to fulfil their military service obligations in Turkey.10 
A further recent example of positive action is the programme Mozaiek of the 
Dutch Science Foundation (NWO), which since 2004 finances PhD trainings and 
scholarships reserved for students from ethnic minority backgrounds.11 Affir-
mative action in the private sector has been much more limited. Unlike the public 
sector programmes, it did not entail preferential hiring but only a duty for 
employers to develop and report on measures taken to increase the share of 
minorities in the workforce. The programme was discontinued in 2004.12 
Some public housing corporations have built special projects for ethnic and 
religious groups, for instance in The Hague a multi-generation housing complex 
for Hindus (completed in 2006) as well as a housing project for elderly Muslims 
(2002), the ‘Muslim’ character of which is expressed in the orientation of the toilet 
seat (not facing Mecca) and in a separation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ spaces in the 
apartment, with the kitchen in the middle, de facto allowing the woman of the 
house to serve the men in the public part without being seen by them.13 Finally, 
the Dutch state subsidizes a wide spectrum of immigrant organizations on an 
ethnic and religious basis and has co-opted their leaders in representative 
councils for each significant ethnic group, which have significant consultation 
prerogatives.14   
Welfare state regimes in comparative perspective 
My argument in this paper is that the effects of immigrant integration policies on 
the socio-economic position of immigrants are to an important extent mediated by 
the structure of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen has distinguished three types 
of welfare states on the basis of their degrees of ‘decommodification,’ which 
‘occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can 
maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’ (1990: 21-22). Decommo-
dification entails both the scope of welfare state entitlements, and the provision 
levels of these entitlements. In Esping-Andersen`s typology, ‘social-democratic’ 
welfare states have the highest, ‘liberal’ welfare states the lowest, and 
‘conservative’ welfare states intermediary levels of decommodification. Among 
the eight countries analyzed in this paper, Sweden belongs to the social-
                                                     
 10 See http://mpbundels.mindef.nl/33_serie/205/33_205_b110.htm, accessed 25 Sep-
tember 2007. 
 11 See www.nwo.nl/subsidiewijzer.nsf/pages/NWOP_5RNBJK, accessed 22 September 
2007. 
 12 See www.wetsamen.nl, accessed 22 September 2007. 
 13 See www.woonconsultancy.nl/13.html and marokko.nl/archief/moslimhuizen.wekken. 
afkeuring.html, both accessed 22 September 2007. 
 14 See for two examples the Consultation Body for Turks at www.iot.nl and the recently 
(2004) added Consultation Body for Chinese at www.ioc-ch.nl, both accessed 22 
September 2007. 
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democratic type, the United Kingdom (along with for instance the USA, Canada, 
and Australia) to the liberal type, and France, Germany, and Switzerland to the 
conservative type. Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands straddle between the 
conservative and the social-democratic type, depending on which aspect of 
decommodification one considers, and of course on the somewhat arbitrary 
decision where to draw the line between the one type and the other (see Esping-
Andersen 1990: 50, 52, 70-72, 74). The scores of our eight countries on Esping-
Andersen’s index are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Indicators of welfare state inclusiveness and benefit levels 
 Decommodification 
score 1980  
(Esping-Andersen) 
Expected benefits 
index 2002  
(*10, Scruggs) 
Summed score 
United Kingdom 23.4 14.5 37.9 
Switzerland 29.8 15.8 45.6 
France 27.5 20.9 48.4 
Germany 27.7 20.9 48.6 
Austria 31.1 22.0 53.1 
Netherlands 32.4 23.3 55.7 
Belgium 32.4 23.5 55.9 
Sweden 39.1 23.9 63.0 
Esping-Andersen`s data refer to 1980, which raises the question whether 
differences across welfare states have changed since then. Scruggs’ (2006) 
analysis of 2002 data, also presented in Table 2, shows a high degree of stability 
in the rank ordering of countries, although the differences seem to be smaller 
than in 1980, suggesting a certain degree of convergence among welfare state 
regimes in Europe. The only change in the rank ordering of countries concerns 
Switzerland, which had an average level of decommodification in 1980, but which 
received the second-lowest score for ‘expected benefits’ in 2002. Combining the 
two indicators in a summed score (see the last column of Table 2), we can 
conclude that during the period 1980-2002 the United Kingdom had by far the 
least decommodified welfare state regime, and Sweden had the most generous 
and inclusive welfare state. The other countries are situated closer together, with 
Switzerland, France, and Germany somewhat closer to the United Kingdom, and 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium somewhat closer to Sweden.15  
                                                     
 15 A further indicator of welfare state protection against market forces that one might 
consider is protection of workers against dismissal. The OECD has compiled a cross-
nationally comparable index for the ‘strictness of employment protection legislation,’ 
which indicates how difficult and expensive it is for employers to fire workers (OECD 
2004). A comparison of our eight countries on this index leads to quite similar cross-
national differences as the decommodification and expected benefits indices reported 
in Table 2. The United Kingdom offers workers by far the least protection against 
dismissal, whereas Sweden offers the most protection. France and Germany are 
however on this indicator more protective than the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria. 
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Why would welfare state ‘decommodification’ or ‘benefit generosity’ matter for the 
socio-economic position of immigrants compared to non-immigrants? Morissens 
and Sainsbury expect ‘better outcomes for migrants in countries with high levels 
of decommodification (the social democratic regime) and worst outcomes in 
countries with low levels of decommodification (the liberal welfare regime)’ (2005: 
641). Their results based on cross-national data on household incomes 
corroborate the expectation that high levels of decommodification decrease 
income differences across non-immigrant households. However, regarding 
differences in income levels between immigrant and non-immigrant families, no 
clear pattern emerged, and the expectation that the difference would be smallest 
where decommodification is high, and lowest in the context of liberal welfare 
states is not corroborated. Among six countries that they compare in detail, they 
find that the composition of household income packages (in terms of the balance 
between earnings and various forms of welfare state transfers) is actually most 
similar between immigrants and natives in the two ‘conservative’ welfare states 
that they compare, France and Germany (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005: 654). 
The authors do not find an explanation for this finding within the welfare state 
regime paradigm, and instead suggest that ‘the important question is whether the 
divergences are related to different immigration regimes’ (Morissens and Sains-
bury 2005: 655).16 
I suggest three reasons why welfare state regimes can have effects on the socio-
economic gap between immigrants and non-immigrants that are exactly the 
reverse of what Morissens and Sainsbury expected. The first can be derived from 
Borjas’ (1989) well-known and empirically corroborated (e.g., Van Tubergen 
2004) hypothesis that immigrants with lower educational skills and concomitant 
weaker labour market position will tend to migrate to countries with a relatively 
equal income distribution, which offer disadvantaged groups relatively good 
protection against economic adversity. Immigration to countries with relatively 
inclusive and generous welfare states will thus be ‘negatively selected,’ whereas 
                                                                                                                                                 
Switzerland comes closest to the United Kingdom in offering little protection to 
workers. Strict employment protection legislation may have a negative impact on the 
labour market opportunities of immigrants because it makes employers more 
reluctant to hire workers, particularly if there is a high degree of uncertainty about the 
qualifications and productivity of these workers, as is often the case with immigrants 
(Kogan 2006). Indeed, Kogan (2006: 709) finds such a negative impact of strict 
employment protection legislation on the employment rate of immigrants, although the 
effect becomes insignificant once she controls for the type of welfare state regime. 
 16 It should be noted, however, that the Luxemburg Income Study data that Morissens 
and Sainsbury use does not allow a cross-nationally consistent identification of the 
immigrant population. Their analysis therefore had to be based on a distinction that 
could be made consistently, but that is highly debatable, namely between citizens 
regardless of country of birth, on the one hand, and foreign-born non-citizens, on the 
other (2005: 642). This means that part of the immigrant population is included in the 
citizen category. Since the degree to which immigrants are citizens varies strongly 
across countries, this is likely to have affected their results. For this reason, the 
Luxemburg Income Study will not be used in this paper. 
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countries with higher levels of social inequality will be more attractive as a 
destination for more highly skilled immigrants.   
Second, once in the country of immigration, immigrants’ decisions whether or not 
to invest in improving their human capital in order to find employment (or to 
prevent becoming unemployed) will be influenced by similar considerations 
(Chiswick and Miller 1995: 248-249). In welfare states with low provision levels 
the economic sanction associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is 
greater and there are strong push factors for immigrants to invest in improving 
their labour market chances through language acquisition, education, and gaining 
knowledge about and developing ties with the host society. By contrast, in 
generous welfare systems, immigrants with human and social capital deficiencies 
can maintain a comparatively decent standard of living without making such 
adaptations.  
This tendency can be reinforced by a third mechanism, the subjective perception 
of welfare benefit levels. Even in comparatively generous welfare states, it is 
certainly no luxury to be dependent on social assistance. However, how the 
standard of living associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is 
subjectively perceived is very likely to be different for natives than for immigrants, 
particularly for those of the first generation. Deprivation is always relative (Gurr 
1970) and depends on comparisons of a present situation to one’s own past, or 
to the situation of relevant reference groups. For natives, the relevant comparison 
group consists of other, but better-off natives, and thus welfare dependence is 
likely to be seen as a strong source of relative deprivation. For immigrants and 
natives alike, welfare dependence will compare negatively (how much negatively 
will depend on the welfare regime) to their former situation when still employed in 
the country of immigration. However, for immigrants that source of relative 
deprivation is not always relevant in the context of European welfare states 
because sizeable numbers (especially refugees) go straight into welfare 
dependence without any prior employment history. In 2002 in the Netherlands, 
for instance, respectively 40, 34, and 33 per cent of recent immigrants from 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia were dependent on social security and welfare 
benefits (CBS 2004: 122) 
With or without prior employment in the immigration country, for immigrants the 
present situation will also be judged relative to their economic situation (or that of 
their parents) when they were still in the country of origin. Even for those on 
welfare benefits, that comparison is likely to be positive, because their income 
from welfare benefits is likely to be well above what they earned in the country of 
origin, even correcting for the greater cost of living in the country of immigration. 
Moreover, immigrants will compare their economic situation to that of family 
members, friends, and co-villagers who stayed behind in the country of origin. 
That comparison, too, will often be favourable, even for those dependent on 
welfare benefits. Especially the first generation often maintains a lifestyle that 
allows them to live at a relatively low cost, allowing them to save some money to 
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send to their kith and kin in the country of origin or even to buy property there. All 
in all, relative deprivation as a push factor to invest in the acquisition of human 
capital that would allow escaping from welfare dependence is likely to be 
considerably weaker for immigrants than for natives and this the more so the 
higher is the level of provisions that a particular welfare regime offers. In other 
words, my expectation is the exact reverse of Morissens and Sainsbury’s, namely 
that the socio-economic gap between immigrants and natives is likely to be 
highest in comparatively generous welfare states such as Sweden, and lowest in 
liberal welfare states such as the United Kingdom. 
The interaction between integration policies and welfare 
state regimes 
Integration policies and welfare regimes interact through a number of 
mechanisms. First, integration policies determine access to equal rights in 
general, and thus also to entitlements to welfare benefits. In all of the Western 
European countries considered here, welfare state rights are in principle 
accessible to all legal residents, but being dependent on welfare may have 
negative consequences, for instance for the possibility to bring over a spouse 
from the country of origin or to obtain a more secure residence permit. In theory 
at least, in some countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, ‘reproachable’ 
long-term dependence on social welfare can lead to deportation. Such 
disadvantages of welfare dependence can be avoided if an immigrant 
naturalizes, but some countries (e.g., Germany) make naturalization conditional 
on not being dependent on welfare. More generally, the accessibility of 
citizenship varies strongly across European countries. As a result, welfare 
dependence is associated with much greater disadvantages and risks in 
countries such as Austria, Germany, and Switzerland where the protection of 
citizenship is difficult to obtain, than in countries with open citizenship regimes 
such as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, 
where most immigrants do not have to fear negative consequences as a result of 
welfare dependence.  
Second, the cultural dimension of integration policies may have consequences 
for the human capital deficiencies with which immigrants enter the labour market. 
Policies that emphasize linguistic and cultural assimilation exert pressure on 
immigrants to acquire skills, knowledge, and social ties that improve their 
chances on the labour market. By contrast, multicultural policies that emphasize 
the own language and culture of immigrants, and stimulate them to orient 
themselves on their ethnic community, may have the unintended consequence of 
sustaining linguistic deficiencies and a lack of cultural ‘soft skills.’ Moreover, the 
emphasis in multicultural policies on the own group and the maintenance of its 
language and culture may be detrimental to the development of social contacts 
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across ethnic boundaries with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important 
source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to much of the knowledge 
and positional resources relevant for successful labour market integration. 
Positive effects of language acquisition on labour market participation have been 
corroborated in many studies (e.g. Chiswick and Miller 1995; Dustmann and 
Fabbri 2003; van Tubergen et al. 2004). Chiswick and Miller (1995: 257-258) cite 
Australian findings that show that English language proficiency among immigrant 
groups declined after the introduction in the 1960s of minority language classes 
in schools. They hypothesize that this is caused by the fact that policies of 
linguistic pluralism decrease the likelihood of English becoming the language 
spoken at home in immigrant families. 
Granovetter (1973) has made the general argument for the importance of 
network ties for access to labour market opportunities. It is not entirely clear 
whether it is necessarily always ‘weak ties’ with relatively distant persons that are 
the most effective, but clearly the persons with whom network ties exist should 
have ‘superior knowledge and influence’ (Wegener 1991: 60). For this reason, 
social contacts with natives will generally be more valuable to an immigrant for 
improving access to labour market opportunities than social contacts with other 
immigrants, because the latter are likely to share a lack of social knowledge and 
influence. Dutch research shows that there is indeed a positive association 
between the labour market participation of immigrants and the degree to which 
they have contacts with ethnic Dutch (e.g., Dagevos 2001; Engbersen 2003).17 
Beyond direct effects on socio-economic mobility, contacts with natives can also 
have an indirect effect because they promote acquisition of the majority 
language. Chiswick and Miller (1995), for instance, find that being married to a 
native spouse and living in an area with a low concentration of co-ethnics are 
strong predictors of majority language proficiency. The negative effect on 
language acquisition of living in an area with many co-ethnics is moreover 
greatest for those immigrants who are lower-educated, and who therefore 
already run a higher risk of unemployment (Chiswick and Miller 1995: 263). 
Cross-national evidence on host language proficiency is scant, but the evidence 
that is available points in the direction that multicultural policies are negatively 
associated with proficiency in the host-country language. Comparing Dutch and 
German Turks, a Dutch study (Dagevos et al. 2007: 45-46) shows that whereas 
52 per cent of German Turks report a good command of the German language 
(and 19 per cent report bad or no command), only 39 per cent of Dutch Turks do 
so (and 28 per cent report bad or no command). These data are however based 
on different surveys with slightly different question wordings. Ersanilli and 
Koopmans (2007) compared Turks in the Netherlands, Germany, and France 
using a standardized survey and a sampling strategy that controlled for the 
                                                     
 17 Veenman (2003) finds a similar relation between interethnic contacts and the 
educational success of second-generation immigrants. 
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region of origin within Turkey, as well as the timing of immigration. They found 
that Dutch Turks use the host-country language least often, report most often that 
they have difficulties speaking the host language, and at the same time 
experience the least difficulty with the Turkish language. After controlling for a 
range of individual-level background variables, the differences between Dutch 
and German Turks on these variables are no longer statistically significant, but 
French Turks are significantly more proficient in the host-country language, use 
that language more often in contacts with friends, spouses, children, and parents, 
and experience more difficulties with Turkish than their counterparts in Germany 
and the Netherlands.  
The same study by Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007) also provides rare cross-
national evidence on the degree of social contacts between Turkish immigrants 
and members of the ethnic majority. Controlling for individual background 
variables, French Turks were significantly more likely to go out with ethnic French 
friends and to receive them as visitors at home. German Turks were however 
significantly more likely to have contacts with German ethnics at work than 
French and Dutch Turks (comparing only those who presently work or have 
previously worked). Taking work and private contacts together, Dutch Turks have 
the least access to interethnic social capital. As we will see further below, 
evidence on spatial segregation corroborates this finding of a relatively low 
degree of social contact between immigrants and natives in the Netherlands, and 
a more limited degree of social segregation in France and Germany.  
Two problems for cross-national comparison of integration 
outcomes 
Nationally-specific definitions and classifications of the immigrant 
population  
A major obstacle for the cross-national comparison of integration outcomes is 
that they use different statistical definitions of the relevant populations. In 
countries with an ethnic citizenship tradition such as Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland, most available statistics use the category of Ausländer, foreigners. 
Due to the restrictive naturalization regimes in the German-speaking countries, 
the nationality criterion captures a relatively large proportion of the immigrant 
population in these countries. However, in countries such as France, Britain, and 
the Netherlands, foreign nationals constitute only half or even less of the total 
immigrant population (see Lederer 1997). 
Therefore, these countries usually use alternative statistical categories in addition 
to the nationality criterion. The Netherlands have a wide definition of their 
statistical category of allochtonen, which refers to persons born abroad as well as 
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persons born in the Netherlands to at least one foreign-born parent. The French 
statistics do not register ethnicity and are based either on nationality or on the 
country of birth. The United Kingdom, finally, publishes statistics based on racial 
identification. 
These differences in statistical categories preclude the use of most of the 
available national data for comparative purposes. However, there are fortunately 
also some data sets that allow one to define the target population consistently 
across countries and independent of nationally-specific classifications. Moreover, 
in other cases, it is possible to gauge the extent to which statistical categori-
zations affect the results by comparing indicators based on different statistical 
categories in the same country, as I do when we discuss incarceration rates. 
Different compositions of the immigrant population 
Given the fact that there are important differences in degrees of integration 
among immigrants from varying countries of origin (e.g., van Tubergen 2004), 
aggregate data on labour market participation, segregation, and crime may be 
influenced by composition effects. Some authors have suggested that the 
comparatively weak socio-economic integration of immigrants in the Netherlands 
results from the fact that the country has taken up more, and less educated 
immigrants than other European countries (e.g., Doomernik 1998; Böcker and 
Thränhardt 2003). If this were correct, cross-national differences could simply be 
due to the different compositions of the immigrant population in various countries, 
and would have little to do with integration policies and welfare state regimes. 
However, this explanation for Dutch integration outcomes does not seem to be 
valid, nor does it fit the more general pattern of cross-national differences that we 
will encounter below, in which Sweden and Belgium share comparatively low 
labour market participation, and high residential segregation and immigrant crime 
rates with the Netherlands. The statistical compendium on stocks and flows of 
immigrants compiled by Lederer (1997: 202ff.) shows that over the period 1960-
1994 the Netherlands had a higher per capita net immigration rate than Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom. But net immigration in Sweden, Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland exceeded the Dutch level. The available statistical 
data do not suggest either that the Netherlands has taken up more lower-
educated immigrants. Van Suntum and Schlottböller (2002: 25-27, 179) present 
comparative data on the gap in the education levels of non-western immigrants 
compared to the native population and show that Dutch immigrants lag further 
behind the native population than their counterparts in Great Britain and Sweden. 
However, in Germany, France, Belgium and Austria, non-western immigrants are 
less highly educated in comparison to the native population than in the 
Netherlands. 
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Nevertheless, where this is possible, the subsequent analyses will control for 
variation in the composition of the immigrant population. Labour market data will 
refer only to immigrants from non-EU countries, thus controlling for the fact that in 
some countries (such as Switzerland) a relatively large part of immigrants 
originate in EU countries, whereas in others (such as the Netherlands), a 
relatively large part comes from outside the EU. In addition, for a few countries 
comparative data on labour market participation that focus on specific ethnic 
groups are available. Comparative data on spatial segregation are available 
separately for a number of ethnic groups, such as Turks and Moroccans. Only 
the incarceration data allow unfortunately no disaggregation to specific countries 
or regions of origin. 
Labour market integration of immigrants cross-nationally 
compared 
From the arguments and evidence on integration policies and welfare state 
regimes that were discussed above, we can derive the following hypotheses 
regarding the labour market participation of immigrants: 
(1) Labour market participation of immigrants (relative to the native 
population) will be lower in relatively generous welfare states of the 
‘social-democratic’ type (Sweden), higher in countries with ‘liberal’ welfare 
states (United Kingdom), and intermediate in countries that have 
‘conservative’ welfare states (Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands). 
(2) Labour market participation of immigrants will be higher in countries 
where equal citizenship rights are difficult to acquire (Austria, Switzerland, 
Germany), lower where individual citizenship rights are easy to acquire 
and pressures towards cultural assimilation are low (United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders), and intermediate where 
individual rights are easily accessible but cultural assimilation pressures 
are high (France, Belgium-Wallonia). 
Combining hypotheses 1 and 2, leads to: 
(3) Welfare regimes and integration policies interact multiplicatively: countries 
that have either limited welfare states with a low provision level (United 
Kingdom) or exclusive integration policies that make immigrants’ rights 
dependent on cultural assimilation and avoidance of welfare dependence 
(Austria, Switzerland, Germany) will have a relatively high labour market 
participation of immigrants. Conversely, countries that have comparatively 
generous welfare states and multicultural integration policies (Sweden, 
Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders) will have a relatively low labour market 
participation of immigrants. Countries that combine a comparatively 
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generous welfare state with integration policies that are individually 
inclusive but culturally assimilationist will have intermediate levels of 
immigrant labour market participation (France, Belgium-Wallonia). 
It is worth pointing out that hypotheses 2 and 3 run counter to the policy 
philosophy of multiculturalism, which assumes that immigrants will integrate 
better, the easier and the quicker they can obtain formal equality, and the more 
they can retain and develop their own cultural identities and practices. On the 
basis of this assumption we would predict the exact opposite of the above 
hypotheses, namely relatively high immigrant labour market participation in 
countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, and low participation rates in 
countries such as Germany and Austria, where immigrants face stronger barriers 
to formal equality, or in countries such as France, where there is little space for 
the recognition of cultural differences. 
Table 3:  Unemployment according to country of birth (in per cent of the 
population of 15-64 years active on the labour market, averages 
1999-2004) 
 native born born in  
non-EU 15-country 
relative unemployment 
level of persons born 
in non-EU 15-country 
Germany* 9.6 15.0 1.56 
Great Britain 4.9 8.6 1.76 
Belgium – Wallonia 10.5 21.0 2.01 
France 8.9 19.1 2.15 
Austria 4.1 9.2 2.24 
Netherlands 2.7 8.0 2.96 
Sweden 5.1 16.2 3.18 
Netherlands 1995** 6.0 19.6 3.26 
Switzerland*** 3.0 11.7 3.90 
Belgium – Flanders 4.4 19.3 4.41 
Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, own calculations, for Germany: Socio-Econo-
mic Panel, own calculations. Data for second quarters 1999-2004, population 
aged 15-64.  
*  Data for Germany:  annual averages 1999-2004;  
**  OECD figures (2006: 177);  
***  Data for Switzerland: second quarters 2003-2004. 
Table 3 shows data from the European Labour Surveys on levels of 
unemployment, comparing the native born to those born in a non-EU country. 
The data cover the period 1999-2004 and the category of EU countries therefore 
only includes those fifteen countries that were members before 2004. Because 
absolute levels of registered unemployment depend on the state of the economy 
and the nature of a country’s system of social security, the most adequate 
measure for comparison is the degree of overrepresentation of people born in a 
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non-EU country among the unemployed, which is presented in the last column of 
the table. Based on this indicator, Germany shows the smallest degree of 
overrepresentation (about 1.5 times the level of the native born), closely followed 
by the United Kingdom.18 In the Walloon part of Belgium19, France, and Austria 
the overrepresentation of immigrants among the unemployed is also compara-
tively limited, at around twice the level of the native born. In the Flemish part of 
Belgium, by contrast, the non-EU foreign born are almost 4.5 times more likely to 
be unemployed than the native born. Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands 
also perform relatively poorly.20  
The relatively high degree of overrepresentation of the foreign born in the 
Netherlands cannot be explained as a result of the low general level of 
unemployment. The unemployment level among immigrants fluctuated 
considerably over the period 1999-2004, from a low of 4.8 per cent in 2001 to a 
high of 11.4 per cent in 2004. Nevertheless, the measure of overrepresentation 
differed only marginally between these years, and was actually smaller (2.61) in 
2001, when general unemployment was at it its low, than in 2004 (2.91). The 
1995 data that are presented in the table further confirm that the over-
representation of immigrants among the unemployed has always been high in the 
Netherlands, regardless of the general level of unemployment. In fact in 1995, 
                                                     
 18 The German data within the European Labour Force Survey do not include the 
country of birth variable. Therefore data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are 
used here instead. These data are not based on a representative sample of all foreign 
born, but are oversampled for specific ethnic groups, among which those originating 
in two non-EU 15 countries, namely Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. To investigate 
whether this use of a different data set influences the comparative results, we can 
analyze the European Labour Force Survey data comparing national citizens to non-
EU foreign nationals, which allows us to also include Germany.  Relative unemploy-
ment rates for people holding the nationality of a non-EU country are generally higher 
than those for the foreign born, because the latter include those – generally socio-
economically better integrated – immigrants who have naturalized. However, the 
ranking of countries is remarkably insensitive to which of the two classification criteria 
we use. From the country with the lowest to the highest relative immigrant 
employment rate, the rank order for the year 2000 based on the nationality criterion is 
Germany and the United Kingdom (both with an overrepresentation rate of 2.20), 
Austria, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, i.e. almost exactly the 
same as in Table 3 based on the country of birth. Further evidence of the validity of 
the German result is provided by OECD (2006: 177) data comparing foreign and 
native born in 2003, which show an immigrant unemployment rate of 9.7%, a native 
rate of 15.7%, and a degree of overrepresentation of 1.73, the lowest degree among 
seven of the eight countries studied in this paper (excluding the United Kingdom for 
which no data are available). 
 19 Brussels has not been included in either of the two Belgian regions, but falls in 
between Wallonia and Flanders regarding both the relative unemployment rate (2.21) 
and the relative labour market participation rate (0.72; compare Table 3) of non-EU 
immigrants.. 
 20 The country differences are largely the same if we analyze men and women 
separately. Regarding the Netherlands, its ranking for women is the same as in Table 
1, but for men the relative unemployment rate is more favourable in Sweden and only 
Flanders and Switzerland have higher rates than the Netherlands. 
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the Netherlands had the highest immigrant unemployment rate (19.6 per cent) 
after Sweden (21.7 per cent), even though at the time the Dutch native 
unemployment rate was the lowest (6.0 per cent) among the six countries 
investigated here for which the OECD reports 1995 data.21 
These results are in line with the results of a multilevel analysis of the European 
Labour Force Survey data undertaken by Kogan (2006), who shows that 
controlling for broad regions of origin, education level and age, immigrants born 
in non-EU countries have a significantly higher rate of unemployment rate in 
countries with a social-democratic welfare regime (Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland in her sample) and, at least for men, a significantly lower rate of 
unemployment in countries with a liberal welfare regime (the United Kingdom and 
Ireland). Unfortunately, Kogan's analysis does not include an indicator for 
integration policies and therefore does not allow us to draw conclusions about 
interactions between welfare and integration regimes.22  
Although of obvious importance, unemployment is only a limited indicator of 
labour market participation. There are a variety of other reasons why people can 
be outside the labour market. Some of these can be characterized as forms of 
hidden unemployment, particularly in the context of strong welfare states. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, almost one million people (on a population of sixteen 
million) enjoy disability benefits, a much greater percentage than in any other 
European country. In addition, there are people who receive social welfare but 
who are not registered as unemployed. In the Netherlands, the most important 
category to which this applies consist of single women with young children, who 
receive social welfare benefits without having to seek employment. Finally, some 
people, in particular part of the married women, are not active on the labour 
market at all.  
We therefore get a more encompassing view of the labour market participation of 
immigrants by looking at the net labour market participation of the population 
between 15 and 64 years of age (i.e., the percentage of persons in that category 
who are gainfully employed). Table 4 shows these labour market participation 
figures of natives and persons born in non-EU countries. Again, we are especially 
                                                     
 21 Excluding the United Kingdom and Switzerland, for which no 1995 data are available, 
and taking the 1993 figure for Germany in the absence of data for 1995.  
 22 A further disadvantage of this study, as well as of multi-level studies of integration 
outcomes more generally, is that in order to arrive at sufficient numbers of country 
cases, these studies have to include cases that are very different in terms of 
immigration history from the Western European countries that are central in this 
paper. Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Finland have only very recently become 
immigration countries and many of the recent immigrants in these countries are single 
males and females who have not (yet) brought over their families. In addition, the 
Southern European countries have large numbers of illegal immigrants, which are 
most likely not captured by surveys, but raise the question to what extent those 
immigrants who do participate in surveys are representative of the larger immigrant 
population. 
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interested in the relative difference between the labour market participation rates 
of the two groups. It turns out that there is only one country, namely Austria, in 
which there is almost no difference between the labour market participation of 
non-EU immigrants and that of natives. Germany, Switzerland, and Great Britain 
perform relatively well, as do to a lesser extent France and the Walloon part of 
Belgium. Switzerland is the only country where the results in Tables 3 and 4 
diverge strongly because regarding the unemployment level of non-EU 
immigrants Switzerland performed very poorly. The Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the Flemish part of Belgium have the lowest levels of non-EU immigrant 
participation on the labour market. 
Table 4:  Net labour market participation (employment) according to country 
of birth (in per cent of the population of 15-64 years, averages 
1999-2004)  
 native born born in  
non-EU 15-country 
relative employment level 
of persons born in  
non-EU 15-country 
Austria 68.1 66.6 0.98 
Germany* 68.5 59.4 0.87 
Switzerland** 79.5 68.5 0.86 
United Kingdom 72.0 60.3 0.84 
France 63.5 52.5 0.83 
Belgium – Wallonia 56.4 45.1 0.80 
Netherlands 75.1 57.8 0.77 
Sweden 75.1 54.4 0.72 
Belgium – Flanders 64.4 45.3 0.70 
Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, own calculations, for Germany: Socio-Econo-
mic Panel, own calculations. Data for second quarters 1999-2004, population 
aged 15-64.  
*  Data for Germany:  annual averages 1999-2004;  
**  Data for Switzerland: second quarters 2003-2004. 
Although we limit the comparison to immigrants from non-EU countries, it is still 
possible that the cross-national differences can be attributed in whole or in part to 
different compositions of the population of non-EU immigrants. However, some 
controlled comparisons for specific immigrant groups are available, which do not 
suggest that composition effects play an important role in explaining the cross-
national differences that we find in Table 3. In a study comparing immigrants from 
the former Yugoslavia in Sweden and Austria based on data from 1996-1997, 
Kogan (2003: 607) finds that in Austria, ex-Yugoslavs were more likely to be 
active in the labour force than native Austrians (84 per cent against 72 per cent), 
whereas in Sweden ex-Yugoslavs were much less likely to be active in the labour 
market than native Swedes (54 per cent against 85 per cent). Euwals et al. 
(2006: 30) have undertaken a similar comparison of Turkish immigrants in 
Germany and the Netherlands on the basis of 2002 data, in which they use the 
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Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to compute differences between natives 
and Turkish immigrants that are standardized for the impact of age and the level 
of education. In both countries, the employment rate of Turkish immigrants is 
lower than that of natives, even when controlling for age and the level of 
education. However, the differences between Turks and natives are much larger 
in the Netherlands (21 per cent for men and 20 per cent for women) than in 
Germany (6 per cent for men and 7 per cent for women).  
If we return to the hypotheses that we formulated at the beginning of this section, 
we can conclude that they are largely confirmed by the comparative data. In line 
with hypothesis 1, the United Kingdom with its liberal welfare regime shows a 
relatively good labour market integration of non-EU immigrants, whereas the 
Swedish social-democratic welfare state is associated with relatively poor levels 
of labour market integration. However, the welfare state perspective does not 
explain why Austria, Germany, and Switzerland have even higher immigrant 
labour market participation rates than the United Kingdom, and why the 
Netherlands and Flanders perform as poorly as Sweden. Moreover, the welfare 
state perspective does not explain why Wallonia does better than Flanders, 
because the welfare state regime is – unlike important aspects of integration 
policies – uniform across Belgium.  
These deviations are well-explained by the second hypothesis, which claims that 
labour market participation of immigrants will be inversely related to the ease with 
which immigrants can obtain formal equality and the absence of strong pressures 
towards cultural assimilation. In turn, the integration policy perspective is faced 
with the deviation of the United Kingdom, which grants immigrants a relatively 
high degree of equality and recognition of cultural differences, but still achieves a 
relatively high level of labour market integration. The combined hypothesis 3 
therefore captures the results best: countries that either have a limited welfare 
state or a restrictive and assimilationist integration regime display the highest 
level of immigrant labour market participation. By contrast, countries that combine 
a generous welfare state with easy access to equal citizenship rights and limited 
assimilation pressures (Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Flemish part of 
Belgium) show the poorest labour market integration of immigrants. 
Residential segregation cross-nationally compared 
When we consider residential segregation, it is less obvious to expect an effect of 
welfare state regimes. On the one hand, strong welfare states reduce income 
inequality, which may increase the opportunities of immigrants on the housing 
market. On the other hand, we have seen that immigrants tend to be more often 
economically inactive in strong welfare states, which may again reduce their 
opportunities on the housing market, because it makes them dependent on 
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cheap or subsidized housing that tends to be concentrated in certain 
neighbourhoods.  
A more clear-cut expectation can be formulated regarding the effect of integration 
policies. Segregation is not just determined by financial opportunities, but also by 
cultural preferences for living among people of the same ethnicity or religion, both 
among immigrant minorities, and among the native majority. Although voluntary 
self-segregation of immigrants may play a role, generally the preferences of the 
majority will have a stronger impact on segregation patterns. Members of the 
majority have more opportunities to choose where to live, because of higher 
disposable income, better knowledge of the housing market and in some cases – 
such as the Netherlands – because housing distribution systems privilege those 
with longer periods of local residence. My hypothesis is that preferences for living 
among co-ethnics among both immigrants and the majority population will be 
enhanced by integration policies that de-emphasize assimilation and that 
encourage immigrants to maintain their own cultural practices. Policies of cultural 
difference can contribute to estrangement of the majority population from 
minorities because of linguistic communication problems and divergent cultural 
practices, which make natives feel less ‘at home’ in neighbourhoods where many 
immigrants come to live (see, e.g., Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The 
guiding hypothesis for this section therefore is: 
(4) Residential segregation of immigrants will be more pronounced in 
countries with multicultural integration policies such as the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, and less pronounced in 
countries that put more emphasis on assimilation of immigrants to the 
majority culture, such as Austria, Germany, France, and Switzerland. 
Residential segregation is not easy to compare cross-nationally. In addition to the 
usual problem of variation in the composition of immigrant populations, 
segregation data are sensitive to the size of the spatial units (wards, districts, 
etc.) that are used to compute indices (see, e.g., Musterd and de Winter 1998; 
Musterd 2005). However, this problem is manageable, as data are for some cities 
are available for different spatial levels of aggregation, which show that the 
choice of the unit of analysis has only a small effect on the resulting segregation 
indices.23 Table 5 presents data for a range of ethnic groups in cities in the eight 
countries discussed in this paper. 
                                                     
 23 The range figures in Table 4 for Bangladeshi in Birmingham and London are based 
on the ward level (about 10,000 inhabitants, the lower bound of the range) or 
alternatively the enumeration district level (about 500 inhabitants, the upper bound of 
the range) as the unit of analysis. The Amsterdam range for Turks refers to three 
levels of spatial aggregation distinguishing respectively 1,216 grids (the upper bound) 
and 389 or 93 neighbourhoods (with identical segregation levels at the lower bound). 
See Musterd 2005: 333-334. 
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Table 5:  Segregation indices (0-100) of various immigrants groups in 
selected European cities 
Antwerp – North Africans 70 
Bradford – Bangladeshi 70 
Birmingham – Bangladeshi 68-79 
Birmingham – Pakistani  66 
London –Bangladeshi 63-75 
Stockholm –Turks 60 
Bradford – Pakistani 60 
Brussels – Moroccans 59 
Stockholm – Iranians 57 
Stockholm – Somali 56 
The Hague – Turks 53 
The Hague – minorities 52 
Rotterdam – Turks 50 
London – Pakistani 49 
The Hague – Moroccans 48 
London – Black Caribbean 45 
Birmingham – Black Caribbean 42 
Rotterdam – minorities 42 
Amsterdam – Moroccans 42 
Amsterdam – Turks 40-45 
The Hague – Surinamese 39 
Amsterdam – Surinamese 34 
Zurich – Turks * 34 
Amsterdam – minorities 33 
Ile de France – Moroccans * 33 
Ile de France – Algerians * 32 
Düsseldorf – Turks 30 
Vienna – foreigners 30 
Düsseldorf – Moroccans 28 
Frankfurt – Moroccans 27 
Bern – Muslims 27 
Rotterdam – Surinamese 26 
Lille – non-French 25 
Paris – Algerians 23 
Frankfurt – Turks 19 
Munich – foreigners 12 
Sources:  Murdie and Borgegard 1998 (Stockholm, Turks and Somali); Gächter 2005 
(Bern); Heye and Leuthold 2004 (Zurich); Préteceille 2006 (Ile de France); all 
other data from Musterd 2005. All figures refer to segregation indices except 
those indicated with an asterisk, which refer to dissimilarity indices between 
the respective group and natives. 
The results in the table make two things clear. First, that it is important to look at 
different ethnic groups separately. In both the United Kingdom and in the 
Netherlands, levels of segregation are much higher for groups with a Muslim 
background than for Caribbean blacks (Surinamese in the Netherlands). In 
Stockholm (see Murdie and Borgegard 1998: 1879) we find similar differences 
between Muslim groups such as the Turks, Somalis, and Iranians, on the one 
hand, and European immigrants (not presented in the table) such as the Poles 
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(segregation index 20) or the Yugoslavs (31) on the other. In Paris, we find 
similarly that Algerians live more segregated than Portuguese (segregation index 
12; see Musterd 2005: 334). These group differences confirm the above 
argument that segregation is related to the degree of cultural difference. As a 
result of a combination of self-segregation and avoidance by the majority, the 
more culturally distinct Muslim groups live more strongly physically segregated 
from the rest of the population than European immigrants or than postcolonial 
immigrants from the Caribbean, who usually speak fluent Dutch or English and 
mostly have a Christian background. 
Second, we observe major differences across cities and countries, even if we 
hold the region or country of origin of immigrant groups constant. These 
differences are largely in line with the expectations formulated in hypothesis 4. 
Considering the Turks, we find that they have the highest rates of segregation in 
Stockholm and in the three Dutch cities, whereas in Zurich, Düsseldorf, and 
Frankfurt they live more equally dispersed across the city. Another Swiss city, 
Bern, falls in the same pattern, although here the data refer to all Muslims taken 
together.  
Immigrants from the Maghreb (North Africans, Moroccans, Algerians) live most 
segregated in Antwerp and Brussels, followed by the three Dutch cities. Clearly 
lower levels of segregation of Maghrebians are found in Düsseldorf and 
Frankfurt, as well as in Paris and the region directly around Paris, Ile de France. 
The latter finding is remarkable given the impression that has arisen because of 
the banlieux riots of 2006 that French urban regions are characterized by 
particularly high levels of ethnic segregation. 
Finally, for a few cities we can compare segregation of all minorities or foreigners 
taken together. These results fall into the same pattern as those for Turks and 
Maghrebians. Levels of segregation are highest in the three Dutch cities, 
somewhat lower in Vienna, and clearly lower in Lille and Munich. For the United 
Kingdom, the only direct comparison that can be made is for Caribbeans with the 
Netherlands. This comparison shows higher levels of segregation in British than 
in Dutch cities. Comparing the British figures for Pakistani and Bangladeshi to the 
Muslim groups in other countries confirms that British cities are strongly 
segregated, at or above the levels of Antwerp, Brussels, and Stockholm. 
We can conclude from this section that there indeed seems to be a connection 
between multicultural integration policies and social segregation, as suggested 
by the high levels of residential segregation found in Belgium, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. By contrast, countries that have put more 
emphasis on assimilation show more moderate levels of residential segregation. 
In Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, high levels of spatial segregation 
combine with low labour market participation, but in the United Kingdom high 
levels of ethnic segregation co-exist with a relatively high rate of labour market 
participation. Nevertheless, those groups that are most strongly segregated in the 
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United Kingdom – Pakistani and Bangladeshi – are also the ones that have the 
lowest labour market participation (Modood et al. 1997). This suggest that the link 
between low labour market participation and segregation also exists in the United 
Kingdom, but that it occurs at a higher overall level of labour market participation 
due to the country’s less generous welfare state.   
Crime levels cross-nationally compared: immigrants’ share 
of the prison population 
If there is one aspect of integration that can be misused for mobilizing ethnic 
hatred, it is immigrants’ real or alleged association with crime. There are several 
reasons why many immigrant groups across Europe display higher crime levels 
than the population average. Immigrants are disproportionately often unemployed 
and poor and they have a much younger population structure than the rest of the 
population. These are well-known risk factors for criminal behaviour. Part of the 
overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for crimes may in 
addition be due to discriminatory tendencies among the police or the judiciary.  
The point that I want to make is therefore not that immigrants are more likely to 
be criminals than other citizens. What interests me here is to what extent there 
are cross-national differences in the rate of overrepresentation of immigrants 
among the prison population. Because the chances of getting involved in criminal 
behaviour are strongly linked to a person's socio-economic position, my hypo-
thesis is: 
(5) Countries with low labour market participation of immigrants will also be 
those where immigrants are more strongly overrepresented among the 
prison population. 
Table 6 shows the share of foreigners in the prison population relative to the 
share of foreign citizens in the whole population of a country. Unfortunately, no 
cross-national incarceration data are available on the basis of ethnicity or country 
of birth. However, Table 6 includes alternative statistical indicators for two 
countries, based on the foreign-born prison population in the Netherlands, and on 
racial minorities in the United Kingdom. Although these alternative measures 
strongly influence absolute incarceration rates (see the first column in the table), 
they do not strongly affect the measure that interests us here, namely the degree 
of overrepresentation of immigrants in the prison population (the third column).  
The variation across the countries is stark. Overrepresentation of inmates from 
an immigrant background is by far strongest in the Netherlands, where their 
share in the prison population is, depending on the statistical basis chosen, six to 
eight times as high as in the general population. In the United Kingdom, by 
contrast, foreigners and racial minorities are only two to three times more likely to 
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be in prison. The cross-country differences in Table 6 are very similar to those 
that we found for labour market participation. Next to the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Belgium also perform badly on both counts, whereas the overrepresentation 
of immigrants in German and Austrian, and to a lesser extent Swiss prisons is 
comparatively limited.24 France is situated in the middle on both counts. 
Table 6:  Share of foreign persons in the prison population, 2002-2004 (for 
the Netherlands also foreign-born prison population, for the UK 
racial minorities) 
 Foreigners as 
% of the prison 
population 
Foreigners as 
% of general 
population 
Degree of over-
representation 
of foreigners 
Prison population 
rate per 100,000 
inhabitants (2004) 
Netherlands 33.2% 4.2% 7.9 123 
Netherlands 
(foreign born, 2002) 
53.0% 9.5% 5.6 123 
Sweden 27.2% 5.4% 5.0 81 
Belgium 40.9% 8.3% 4.9 88 
France 21.4% 5.6% 3.8 91 
Switzerland 70.5% 19.1% 3.7 81 
Austria 33.0% 9.4% 3.5 110 
Germany 29.9% 8.8% 3.4 98 
England and Wales  12.2% 3.9% 3.1 141 
United Kingdom 
(racial minorities, 
2000) 
18.0% 7.5% 2.4 141 
Sources:  International Centre for Prison Studies; Home Office (racial minorities UK); 
Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen (foreign born NL); OECD figures on foreign 
population. (see http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/europe.html, 
last accessed 18 December 2007) 
One might alternatively argue that a strong overrepresentation of immigrants in 
prisons is not so much caused by variation in the levels of involvement of 
immigrants in crime as by differences in the general level of incarceration across 
countries. A similar level of immigrant incarceration might then lead to strong 
overrepresentation in countries with a generally low incarceration rate. 
Conversely, one can argue that tough crime policies characterized by high 
incarceration rates disproportionately affect immigrants, and that therefore 
immigrant overrepresentation in the prison population will be higher where 
general incarceration rates are high. As the final column of Table 6 shows, 
neither of these alternative explanations is valid as there is no correlation 
whatsoever between the general incarceration rate of the population and the 
degree to which immigrants are overrepresented in prisons. 
                                                     
 24 The Swiss result should be interpreted with caution. Because the share of foreigners 
in the Swiss population is so much higher than in the other countries (see the second 
column of Table 6), the overrepresentation rate is affected by a ceiling effect. 
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Conclusions 
The experiences of the Northwest European immigration countries that have 
been considered in this paper can be seen as a natural experiment on the 
integration of immigrant newcomers and the management of cultural diversity. All 
of these were relatively ethnically homogenous countries that turned into 
immigration countries roughly at the same time in the 1950s and 1960s. With the 
exception of Britain – where postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean and 
South Asia predominated – all of them recruited a large part of their immigrant 
populations from Mediterranean countries, including the Muslim countries of the 
Maghreb and Turkey. 
The policies that countries developed to incorporate these immigrants were in the 
initial guest-worker days quite similar, but started to diverge once it became clear 
that immigration had become a permanent phenomenon. Some countries with a 
more ethnic tradition of citizenship, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, 
chose to retain high barriers for migrants to become full citizens and made 
residence rights dependent on performance on the labour market and absence of 
a criminal record. Moreover, these countries made few concessions to 
immigrants’ cultural specificity. Other countries such as the Netherlands and 
Sweden chose the opposite direction and argued that integration could best be 
achieved by granting immigrants easy access to full citizenship rights, security of 
residence even in the case of welfare dependence or conviction for crimes, and 
state support and protection for their languages, cultures, and ethnic 
organizations and institutions. France followed a combination of individual 
equality and reluctance to recognize and promote cultural group differences. 
Now, some 25 years after these policies were put into place, we can see how 
these different treatments have affected the outcomes of integration in a variety 
of domains such as the labour market, segregation, and crime. The Netherlands 
play a crucial role in this natural experiment, because they implemented the 
prescripts of multiculturalism as a philosophy of integration (Favell 1998) to an 
extent that probably no other European country has. If we take the results of 
Dutch integration policies as a test case for whether state-sponsored 
multiculturalism is a successful recipe for the integration of immigrants, the 
conclusion is quite sobering. On the basis of the multicultural philosophy, the 
Netherlands should have been a country that has been comparatively successful 
in solving problems of integration and combating exclusion and segregation. But 
quite to the contrary, the Netherlands are faced with low labour market 
participation, strong segregation, and comparatively high levels of crime among 
immigrants. The Netherlands share these disappointing integration outcomes 
with two countries that have followed a similar integration philosophy, Sweden 
and (particularly the Flemish part of) Belgium. By contrast, those countries that 
according to the assumptions underlying the multicultural integration philosophy 
should have been faced with particularly acute integration problems – Austria, 
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Germany, and Switzerland – actually perform better, whether we look at labour 
market participation, segregation levels, or incarceration rates. 
Throughout this paper, I have emphasized that it is important to consider the 
interaction between multicultural integration policies and the welfare state. In 
countries with a limited welfare state such as the United Kingdom and the 
classical immigration countries, immigrants are by and large forced by the 
discipline of the market to make it on their own. Although a few may survive in 
ethnic niches, most immigrants will have to acquire the linguistic and cultural 
skills that are necessary to earn a living. However, in countries such as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium, immigrants were able to survive on welfare 
supports without making such adjustments. The less tolerant reactions to 
immigrants in European welfare states must also be seen in this context. In the 
absence of a strong welfare state, immigration tends to be economically 
advantageous to most people, because it makes services and products available 
at a lower cost. But given the welfare state dependency that multicultural policies 
have brought about in countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium, 
immigrants are not necessarily an economic enrichment (see for the Netherlands, 
e.g., Lakeman 1999; van Dalen 2001; Ederveen et al. 2004: 52 ff.).  
Why did other European countries do better? The United Kingdom showed 
favourable outcomes regarding the labour market and crime levels, but it has 
very high levels of residential segregation. The fact that native Britons and 
especially Muslim immigrants often live largely separate lives has in recent years 
become an issue of controversial debates in Britain, which started with the 
Community Cohesion Report (Home Office 2001) that evaluated the causes of 
ethnic riots in Northern English cities with a high concentration of Muslims in the 
Summer of 2001. Since then, home-grown terrorist cells that originated in such 
segregated communities have provided further fuel to these debates. Nonethe-
less, the United Kingdom can be seen as an example of a country that has 
implemented multicultural policies – albeit of a more limited nature than the 
Netherlands – without producing negative socio-economic integration outcomes, 
with the notable exception of residential segregation. The reason that I have 
advanced is that the United Kingdom has a less generous welfare state than 
Continental Northwest European countries, with more emphasis on self-reliance 
and more opportunities for low-wage employment. An additional explanation for 
the comparatively favourable British results may be that the British immigrant 
population is strongly dominated by postcolonial groups, which had pre-existing 
linguistic and cultural ties to the immigration country.  
The German-speaking countries have achieved their comparatively good per-
formance along a different path. Although these countries, or at least Germany 
and Austria, have relatively generous and encompassing welfare states, their 
restrictive aliens legislation has made naturalization and residence rights 
dependent on performance. Immigrants who become long-term dependent on 
social welfare risk expulsion, or it can be a barrier to a more secure residence 
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status. In these countries an immigrant also risks his residence status or will fail 
to get a more secure one in the case of conviction for crimes, even relatively 
minor ones. In a way, these welfare states have replaced the discipline that the 
market exerts on immigrants in countries such as the United Kingdom or the 
United States with the discipline of the state. By contrast, the Dutch and Swedish 
approaches, which offered immigrants encompassing rights including un-
restricted access to the full panoply of welfare state benefits without demanding 
much in return, may have been well-intended, but, instead of building on 
immigrants’ ambitions and energy, have often turned them into passive welfare 
state clients.  
To prevent such outcomes, European countries may choose to restrict the 
accessibility and benefit levels of welfare and social security, and to become thus 
more like the United Kingdom or the United States. A recent move in this 
direction in the Netherlands has been to abolish entitlements to social welfare for 
those under the age of 27. Another type of policy response that many European 
countries have adopted – not coincidentally first introduced in the Netherlands – 
has been an increased emphasis on linguistic and to some extent also cultural 
assimilation, in the form of obligatory integration courses for both newly arriving 
immigrants, and for those who are dependent on welfare. A final possible policy 
response would be to move in the direction of the German-speaking countries by 
making access to full citizenship rights dependent on performance.  
I emphasize that the sobering conclusions that this paper draws about 
multiculturalism as an integration policy strategy only pertain to its effects on 
socio-economic participation and equality. It may well be the case that multi-
cultural policies have been successful in other regards, for instance the political 
participation of immigrants (e.g., Fennema and Tillie 1999). Moreover, legitimate 
normative reasons have been advanced (among many others, Kymlicka 1995; 
Carens 2000; Parekh 2002) why state support for, and recognition of cultural 
differences is valuable for its own sake. However, the analyses presented in this 
paper indicate that in considering such policies one should take into account that, 
at least in the context of developed welfare states, there are real tradeoffs with 
the goals of socio-economic participation and equality. Normative theories of 
multiculturalism have a tendency to be preoccupied almost exclusively with for-
mal rights and recognition, but it is equally necessary and normatively important 
to look at the outcomes of integration policies in terms of participation, equality, 
and segregation. If there is one thing the European experience teaches us, it is 
that in dealing with the complex issues of difference and equality in immigration 
societies we cannot simply assume that what is normatively preferable from a 
rights-focused point of view of will also be practically efficient from an outcomes 
point of view.  
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